Tuesday, January 31, 2006

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay Part III

At dawn when the two FOOTE Torpedomen, Jim Delaney and Hayden Sensenig, left their Battle Station in the “blast shield” on the No. 2 Torpedo Mount they noticed the ship’s flag down on the Torpedo Tubes and realized there was a body wrapped in it. On investigation they discovered the body of Harvard S. Mix, Radar Technician 2/c. Mix had been blown from his Battle Station on the fantail over 5-inch Gun #5, #4 and #3 (approx. 160-ft.) and landed on the flagstaff on the No. 2 stack. The staff bent down leaving him lying on the No. 2 Torpedo Tubes wrapped in the flag. He was put in a standard green fire-resistant mattress cover and placed in the ship’s “reefer” for burial later. Mix was the first and only victim found until the ship reached Purvis Bay, Florida Island, Solomon Islands.

Mix had reported aboard the FOOTE at Purvis Bay on October 23rd - just three days before Task Group 39 sortied for the prelude to the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay. He had been aboard only eight days - hardly anyone knew him, but he may have been the only individual in WW-II to have died in battle literally wrapped in the flag. Too bad those who, 60-years later, choose to burn the flag could not witness that scene at dawn on November 2, 1943.

At 0625 the THATCHER moved in close alongside to starboard and took the FOOTE in tow.

The CHARLES AUSBURNE and CLAXTON commenced patrolling around the ship. The THATCHER towing cable was secured to the FOOTE’S Starboard anchor chain, veered to 20-fathoms and stopped on deck at the two towing pads. Slack was out of the tow-line and the tow was underway at 0638 - forward speed was 4-knots.

At 0750 the Radar screen broke out in a rash of aerial pips. It looked like a blizzard coming down from the Jap fortress at Rabul. Fifteen friendly planes showed up from the “Cactus Air Force” in response to a call for CAP (Combat Air Patrol). At 0800 the enemy aircraft were visible and consisted of an estimated 60-80 aircraft. The attacking group of Japanese aircraft were identified as VALS (Dive Bombers), Bettys (Twin Engine Bombers) and Zeros (Fighters). Several VALS headed for the FOOTE and her escorts and the THATCHR, CLAXTON, AUSBURNE and FOOTE opened fire with their Main Batteries (two forward 5-inch only on the FOOTE) - the FOOTE fired 20-rounds of 5”AA Common - seventeen 5-inch guns discouraged the Japs from pressing their attack and they veered away and joined in the effort against the main body of the Task Force with the four Cruisers about two miles ahead of the FOOTE and her group. The CAP splashed five Japs, but the bulk of the defense fell to the ship’s weary gun crews and they did very well. Of the sixty or so planes that actually attacked the main group perhaps two dozen were shot down (17-confirmed) and the Japs landed only two hits on the Cruiser MONTPLIER with light damage and wounding only one man.

The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay and the aerial epilogue was over. On the sea and in the air the Japs had taken a colossal thrashing.

The USS SIOUX AT-75 (a 1,450-ton, 3,000 H.P. Sea-Going Tug) approached the FOOTE from the starboard beam with orders to take the tow from the THATCHER. At 0903 the tow line was unshackled from the THATCHER and she joined the other patrolling destroyers. The tow line was secured to SIOUX at 0928. The damaged area of the ship was observed very closely as the towing speed was increased to 9-knots. The FOOTE’S head remained parallel to the SIOUX, but the ship stayed about 10-degrees on the port quarter of the tug. This is probably due to the underwater irregularly of the ship’s skin in the damaged area. The ship secured from G.Q. at 0940; set Condition II Mike; material Condition Baker.


Pumping was continued on the flooded compartments with considerable difficulty due to the pump suctions being stopped up with floating bedding and clothing. A screened intake was devised from the expanded metal holders of the Floater Nets. Bedding and clothing that could be reached and pulled out was dumped overboard.

Making good headway. At 1650 the Shortland Island is abeam to port - distance 30-miles. The USS CHARLES AUSBURNE left the FOOTE escort group to rejoin Task Group 39. Passed Mono Island, abeam to port, at 2018 - distance about 5-miles.

After midnight on November 2nd the seas and wind increased. By dawn on the 3rd the seas were about condition two with the wind about 8-knots. There was a definite increase in the ship’s motion so the course was changed to proceed through Blanche Channel in smoother waters. While in the channel, advantage was taken of the placid water conditions to burn away about 75 square feet of the up-turned main deck, including the top-side ventilation motor and duct at frame 195 starboard.

In response to a routine radio signal - usually sent to a ship returning after battle damage - from the base at Purvis Bay in preparation for FOOTE’S arrival was : “ What do you require?” The reply was, “SLEEP”.

At 0359 the FOOTE tow passed Simbo Island to port - distance 5-miles. Boiler No. 1 and No. 2 are on line for auxiliary purposes. Passed Russell Island at 0415 abeam to starboard - distance 8-miles. Made daily inspection of magazines, ready boxes and smokeless powder samples. All aft magazines are flooded - conditions in the forward magazines are normal. Passed Savo Island at 1015 abeam to starboard - distance 3-miles..

Two miles from the entrance to Purvis Bay the towing cable was made slack and disconnected from the SIOUX - they took the cable in. She then came about to the port side of the FOOTE and made lines fast for handling the ship in the harbor. This maneuver took only 17-minutes before FOOTE was underway again. The SIOUX sailors know their business. Passed through the submarine nets at 1355 and tied up starboard side to THATCHER nested with the CONY and WHITNEY in Berth # 20, Purvis Bay, Florida Island. Although there were many doubts in the past two and a half days - FOOTE will live to fight again.

The remains of Harvard S. Mix RT/2c was transferred to the U.S. Naval Base Hospital No. 7 in preparation for burial ashore.

With help of specialist from the Destroyer Tender USS WHITNEY and an all hands effort from the FOOTE crew, the salvage and battle damage repairs reached a feverish pitch. The primary objective was to recover any casualties that remain in the flooded compartments. With additional pumps from the WHITNEY, the methodical process of removing debris, ammunition, powder canisters and savable materials so leaks could be stopped with wooden wedges, where practical, was moving forward on a 24-hour schedule. Compartments were tightened until leakage did not exceed 50-gallons an hour. Only two additional identifiable men were found: Dennis E. Bleasdale F3/c and Aaeon J. Blue Stm2/c. They, like Mix, were removed to U.S. Naval Hospital No.7 at Tulagi to prepare for internment ashore. Lt. Edgar H. Forrest was in charge of the burial detail on the beach.

On November 6th five torpedoes were removed and the barrel from 5-inch gun No. 4 and No. 5 was removed. All unsafe ammunition recovered was thrown over the side and any ammunition that appeared in salvageable condition was turned over to the Naval Advanced Base, Tulagi. Both of the 5-inch gun barrels were used to replace damaged barrels on the Cruiser COLUMBIA.

Divers from the WHITNEY used under-water carbon-arc torches to cut off the starboard shaft - the stern rose six inches. On November 11th the USS ARISTAEUS (Repair Ship - Battle Damage in forward areas) came alongside and cutting off the port shaft was commenced just aft of the port stuffing box. The shaft broke and a shackle on the lifting gear snapped. The shaft was too heavy for the remaining suspension and fell to the bottom of the bay - the stern rose five inches. The ARISTAEUS removed 5-inch Gun Mount #5 for transportation back to the states - the stern rose another six inches.

The compartments were cleaned with diesel oil and all electrical wiring removed in preparation to shore-up bulkheads. On November 14th workers commenced welding bulkhead stiffeners to make the ship seaworthy.

By the middle of November it was obvious no additional casualties would be found, so the Captain scheduled a Memorial Service on board for all hands at 1600 on November 20th. All hands but those on watch attended.

Salvage and repair work continued, but with more consideration for the crew. With the battle damage and flooding of all the aft crew berthing compartments, 189 of the crew had only the clothes they were wearing when the ship was hit - no personal razor, tooth brush or soap. These problems were solved by the Ship Service on the FOOTE or aboard the Destroyer Tender WHITNEY. The matter of not having a bunk didn’t bother those displaced, because it was too hot below for comfortable sleeping, so they just found a favorite spot topside on the deck - using their life jacket for a pillow. With the proximity to land and the ship not underway, the mosquitoes and other unknown insects from the island were in abundance and very bothersome. When a rain squall appeared there was considerable scurrying about for cover, but most everyone already had their foul-weather spot picked out. During a shower there were sleeping bodies on the mess tables, Fire Room and Engine Room grates, Main Battery Director Barbet or the deck in any space where they would not be disturbed.

Salvage and repair continued until November 22nd. All compartments that had been flooded were cleaned and all material removed. The main deck and sides as well as athwartships bulkheads had been stiffened. Preparations were being made for a tow to Espiritu Santos, New Hebrides for further battle damage repairs in drydock before braving the Pacific for the return trip to the United States. The FOOTE departed Purvis Bay on November 23rd towed by the USS BOBOLINK ATO-131 in company with the destroyer SELFRIDGE.

The USS SELFRIDGE DD-357 (a Porter Class Destroyer) had everything blown off forward of the bridge in a running battle with some Jap destroyers. What an odd sight - an old WW-I auxiliary tug towing the FOOTE and a crippled destroyer for an escort. Guess it made sense - the FOOTE still had working Sonor with her bow undamaged and the SELFRIDGE had her depth charge racks and K-guns in case of a submarine contact. At least, that was the Navy’s logic.

(USS FOOTE War Diary, USS FOOTE Deck Log and USS DENVER War Diary) .

Thursday, January 26, 2006

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay Part II

At 0004 on 2 November 1943 the USS FOOTE was steaming with Task Force 39 in special battle formation in accordance with CTF-39 Operations Plan 3-43 on a course of 345-degrees True, west of Bougainville, to intercept a Japanese Task Force of a reported ten to twelve ships. DesDiv-45 (AUSBURNE, DYSON, STANLY & CLAXTON) was in the van at normal distance ahead of the guide, USS MONTPELIER (CTF-39, ComCruDiv-12). CruDiv-12 (MONTPELIER, CLEVELAND, COLUMBIA & DENVER). DesDiv-46 (SPENCE, THATCHER, CONVERSE & FOOTE) was in column astern of the cruisers with the FOOTE the last ship in the column. The Task Force was steaming approximately parallel to and fifty miles from the west coast of Bougainville.

A further report on the enemy forces at 0100 confirmed it consisted of at least ten ships and was on a course of 125-degrees True, speed 25-knots, distance 83-miles. On reciprocal courses, the American and Japanese forces were speeding toward each other at approximately 50-knots (57.6 MPH)

All ships went to General Quarters and set condition Baker. Personnel on Battle Stations checked and rechecked everything. They were ready. The situation chillingly resembled the one preceding the Battle of Savo Island except this time the scout planes provided phenomenally accurate reports and Admiral Tip Merrill had a winning battle plan with the aggressive Commodore Burke and the “Little Beavers”.

Admiral Merrill was acutely aware that his ships constituted the principal Allied Naval surface force in the South Pacific. His plan was to free his two destroyer divisions (eight ships) to carry the fight to the enemy in keeping with Commodore Burke’s philosophy and use his four cruisers to keep the attackers from approaching the beachhead at Cape Torokina. He would never let the Japanese forces get between his forces and Bougainville.

Commodore Burke’s estimate, based on the latest scout plane report, that they would pick the Japanese task Force up on radar about 0230 proved to be impressively accurate. At 0229 MONTPELIER reported SG Radar contact on a group of unidentified targets bearing 026-degrees True, distance 32,000-yards. The battle was about to begin.

The night was clear and dark with no moon after 2130. The sea was almost calm with swells from the southeast. The wind was force one from the east-southeast. The sky was about 50% obscured with high broken cirro cumulus clouds.

Admiral Merrill ordered a change of course to due north - placing his cruisers as a barrier across the approach to Torokina beachhead. This was the opening move in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay. Once action was joined, he intended to elbow the enemy westward, thereby gaining sea room which would enable him to fight a long range gun battle with the least danger from the very effective Japanese Long Lance Torpedoes.

Commodore Burke intently watched his radar scope and the moment enemy ships showed on it, as previously agreed, without waiting for orders, he led the four destroyers of DesDiv-45 out of line and headed for the Japs. He announced on the TBS (Transmission Between Ships): “Contact bearing 290-degrees True, 30,000-yards. I’m headed in”. The time was 0231.


CTF-39 gave an order to “Execute to follow - turn 18 “, and then to ComDesDiv-46 from CTF-39, “Execute your counter march”. The FOOTE interpreted this to mean the “Turn-18” given at 0235 and proceeded to come right to course 180-degrees True. The remaining three ships of DesDiv-46 executed change to course 180-degrees True by column movement. At 0237 the FOOTE bridge realized they were out of proper station and commenced turning left at maximum speed in order to take station astern of CONVERSE. This necessitated crossing the bow of the cruisers and was prolonged by their turn to the right.

At 0245 DesDiv-45 had approached to within 5,600-yards of the northernmost of three units of the Japanese Task Force. This unit consisted of the cruiser SENDIA and three destroyers. Burke ordered “Execute” and the four destroyers of DesDiv-45 turned and launched five torpedoes each. With twenty torpedoes in the water Burke reported, “My guppies are swimming” and DesDiv-45 opened the range with a turn to starboard.

DesDiv-46 changed course again by turn movement to 165-degrees True at 0250. After the FOOTE had passed clear ahead of the cruisers to regain station - the cruisers opened fire, over the FOOTE, at the Japanese ships after receiving Burke’s message that he had launched his torpedoes.

According to plan, the U.S. cruisers and any destroyer in favorable position was to open fire as the torpedoes from DesDiv-45 exploded against the enemy ships, but none of the torpedoes hit their targets. A Japanese reconnaissance plane had dropped a flare over the U.S. cruisers - Japanese cruiser SENDIA and her destroyers saw them, fired torpedoes at them, changed course (causing DesDiv-45’s torpedoes to miss) and flashed a warning to the remainder of her Task Force. All three Japanese columns turned south to form a single line of battle. It was at this point that Admiral Merrill’s cruisers commenced firing on the enemy with all forty eight guns of the U.S. cruiser’s main batteries. Two of the Japanese destroyers collided trying to evade the concentration of salvos from the U.S. cruisers, sustaining serious damage. The SENDIA was hit, began to burn and fell out of their battle line with a jammed rudder. Steaming in a daze, the Japanese heavy cruiser MYOKO slammed into one of her destroyers ripping off part of her bow.

At 0257 the FOOTE put her rudder hard left in order to come to course of DesDiv-46 and be on station. At 0300 DesDiv-46 changed course by turn movement to 225-degrees True to stay clear of the cruiser’s gun fire. The FOOTE began to steady on this course off the starboard quarter of the CONVERSE - the distance was approximately 300-yards. FOOTE made radar contact on an enemy target bearing 275-degrees True at 0300.30. At 0301 a Japanese torpedo exploded under the stern of FOOTE. It came down the starboard side at a sharp angle and probably hit the lower hull or propeller shaft. The ship was making 31-knots when the torpedo hit and immediately went dead in the water.



The torpedo that hit the FOOTE had been fired by the Japanese northern group (SENDIA and her destroyers) at the U.S. cruisers. About this time the SPENCE was swinging right to give the cruiser column a clear line of fire and sideswiped the THATCHER. That 30-knot brush sent sparks and sweat beads flying and removed a wide swath of paint, but both destroyers continued to travel at high speed. At 0320 a Jap shell punctured SPENCE’S hull at the waterline, but did not explode. SPENCE continued in the fray.

On the FOOTE all radio and detection equipment was out of commission - both Engine Rooms reported “Stopped”. The ship settled with the main deck awash aft with a 5-degree port list. Investigation indicated that the entire stern from frame 185 was blown off (approx. 55-feet) and 5-inch gun mount No. 5 was jammed in train. All 600-lb. depth charge racks, three 20-MM anti-aircraft guns and chemical smoke screen generators were gone.

At 0306 the captain attempted to turn over the engines, but stopped because of the tearing and pounding noise aft.

Admiral Merrill was demonstrating superb skill in maintaining his cruisers in flawless formation while repeatedly reversing course and changing speed so as to retain his blocking position for the beachhead at Cape Torokina while presenting the Japanese gunners with constantly changing problems of range and deflection. Through over thirty minutes of maneuvers and speed changes he always managed to be somewhere else when the enemy shells or torpedoes arrived.

After the FOOTE was hit and lying dead in the water between the Japanese and U.S. cruisers a snooper appeared overhead and dropped red and white parachute flares. These flares reflecting off the low clouds, combined with star-shells, turned the night into an eerie twilight and deprived the U.S. forces of some of their radar advantage. Surprisingly, no enemy salvos fell closer than about 200-yards of the FOOTE. At 0310 FOOTE’S radio and radars were back in service and the torpedo hit was reported by TBS and a request made for all friendly ships to stay clear. Despite this warning a DesDiv-46 destroyer moved in and laid a smoke screen around the ship and sped off to join the melee.

Because of the shock of the torpedo explosion, search and fire-control radar required considerable tuning to obtain results sufficient to track and plot U.S and enemy forces.

At 0340 the smoke began to drift clear. The Damage Control parties were busy trying to lighten the ship aft. Each depth charge remaining on the ship was thrown overboard after the pistol or booster was removed to insure it would not explode under the ship. Depth charge arbors and empty acetylene and oxygen cylinders went over the side. All full cylinders were moved to the bow and lashed down for possible future use. It was decided that the torpedoes would remain in their tubes in the event an enemy ship approached within range.

Damage Control parties were trying to pump flooded compartments with portable submersible pumps. Odor of fuel oil was extremely strong. Enemy forces were out of sight when the smoke cleared and the U.S. cruisers were at 225-degrees True, distance 4-miles, still firing and moving west. Pumping failed to reduce water levels in all compartments aft of frame 172. Leaking through the shaft alleys into the after Engine Room is being controlled with fire and bilge pumps. The Machine Shop and “Guinea Pullman” are intact.

An unidentified plane made a run on the ship at 0417, bearing 218-degrees True - very low - apparently making a torpedo run. The FOOTE opened fire at 3,600-yards with all 5-inch guns but No. 5. Fire from No. 4 gun was ceased after four rounds because of the violent vibration it caused in the vicinity of the damaged area. The plane turned away at approximately 1-mile and FOOTE ceased firing when the range was 6,500-yards and still opening. The FOOTE had expended 22 rounds of A.A. Common with no apparent damage to the attacking plane. At 0419 contact was lost with all enemy and friendly surface forces. Ceased pumping compartments C-201-L and C-202-E. C-202-E was dry and C-201-L had about 6-nches of oil in it.

Jettisoned the port K-guns, depth charge roller loaders and 5-inch practice loading machine less rammer and rammer motor plus pump which was moved to the foc’s’le and lashed down. The ready ammunition from the No. 4 handling room was moved forward. Heavy tools and steel bar stock was moved from the general work areas and placed on the foc’s’le on the starboard side. The over-side torpedo handling crane was jettisoned. The after Engine Room bulkhead was as far aft as could be reached and it was shored securely with concentration in the vicinity of the shafts. With all efforts to lighten the ship aft, the port list was reduced from 5-degrees to about 3-degrees and the damaged stern raised approximately three inches above sea level as a result of the weight removal and the pumping of compartment C-201-L and C-202-E. Draft at the bow is 6-feet. By 0525 there was a great deal of confidence that the ship could be saved.

Dawn was breaking and at 0526 radar contact was regained with the returning U.S. cruisers and destroyers - the battle was over - now to get the ship back to Purvis Bay, Florida Island, Solomon Islands. Muster on station - there were nineteen dead or missing and sixteen injured. The Japs had taken a colossal beating - one cruiser and one destroyer sunk, two destroyers badly damaged, one heavy cruiser severely damaged by collision and one enemy heavy cruiser severely damaged by gunfire. The surviving Jap ships were headed for Rabul at best speed.

The FOOTE was the worst casualty in Task Force 39. The SPENCE was holed at the waterline by a projectile that did not explode - bruised, as was the THATCHER, by the 30-knot sideswipe, but both were still battle ready. The DENVER took three 8-inch hits with Japanese armor-piercing projectiles that did not explode - one in the starboard bow and out the port side, one entered the starboard side Paravane Storage and passed out the port side about 18-inches above the water line and one through the forward stack. She remained ready to fight. Looks like the Japs are having a little ammunition problem.

The Task Force must now get ready for the inevitable massive air attack that is expected from the Japanese fortress at Rabul in retaliation for their defeat.
(Continued)

(USS FOOTE War Diary, USS DENVER War Diary, Admiral Arleigh Burke, by E. B. Porter, U.S. Destroyer Operations in WW-II & USS SPENCE Narrative of Action)

Thursday, January 19, 2006

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay

On 24 October 1943, Commodore Arleigh A. Burke, ComDesRon-23, was summoned by Admiral Halsey to a meeting with the major participating Commanders in the up-coming invasion of Bougainville. The meeting was held at Camp Crocodile on Guadalcanal, across Iron Bottom Sound from Purvis Bay at Florida Island where Task Force 39 would assemble.

Rear Admiral Ray Thurber handled the actual briefing. He told the assembled officers that various scattered preliminary landing, bombings and bombardments was planned to perplex and it was hoped, disperse the Japs. The Third Amphibious Force, covered by Task Force 39, would land 14,000 U.S. Marines near Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay - halfway up the west coast of Bougainville.

This would be a daring, but logical operation. It would be daring because it by-passed the Treasury and Shortland Islands. It would be logical because Cape Torokina was lightly defended and was located midway between the Jap airfields at the northern and southern ends of the island.

The idea was - instead of fighting through the jungle to capture an enemy airfield - the Americans would build their own airstrip at Empress Augusta Bay and let the Japs fight through the jungle to do the capturing - like at Guadalcanal.

The following afternoon, 25 October 1943, Admiral Tip Merrill’s Task Force 39 was in Pervis Bay finalizing preparations for the campaign. Commodore Burke scheduled an afternoon meeting of his destroyer commanders to brief them on their role as part of Task Forrce-39. He then set out to inspect each ship of his eight DesRon-23 Destroyers before the meeting..

The Task Force was organized as follows: Van Destroyers (DesDiv-45), Capt. Arleigh A. Burke (ComDesRon-23): CHARLES F. AUSBURNE (Flag), DYSON, STANLY & CLAXTON.
Main Body (CruDiv-12), Rear Adm. Tip Merrill (CTF-39): MONTPELIER (Flag), CLEVELAND, DENVER & COLUMBIA.
Rear Destroyers (DesDiv-46), Commander Bernard L. Austin: SPENCE (Flag), THATCHER, CONVERSE & FOOTE.

It was while inspecting the CLAXTON that Commodore Burke first saw the "Little Beaver" painted on one of their Torpedo Tubes.

At the end of the afternoon meeting, in which Burke explained to his Commanders their rather awesome duties of the next few days and nights, he asked for suggestions for a distinguishing emblem for the entire squadron. When nothing was forthcoming, he offered the "Little Beaver" he had seen on the CLAXTON - the proposal was unanimously accepted - so, the "Little Beaver" squadron was born.

The following morning, 26 October 1943, Task Group 39.3, comprising Cruisers CLEVELAND and DENVER accompanied by AUSBURNE, SPENCE, CLAXTON & FOOTE sortied from Pervis Bay and steamed up through the Slot. This force was followed at some distance by eight troop carrying APDs, escorted by three destroyers. They were joined by four additional transports along the way.

Task Group 39.3 had orders to support the landing on Treasury Island and stand off to the west in a covering position to intercept any enemy surface forces sent to interfere with the operation. The landing of 6,000 New Zealanders was scheduled for 0600 on 27 October 1943. At 2300 we went to G.Q. and set material condition AFIRM. Task Group 39.3 is steaming in Night Battle Formation - speed 25-knots. Our position is astern of SPENCE as rear force screen. At 0150, radar picked up a Bogie - distance 22-miles.

It was a single aircraft that closed, but not threatening enough for the Task Force to open fire. The Bogie continued to snoop around dropping an occasional flare. At 0300 he dropped a flare in AUSBURNE’s wake. The Task Group maintained the planned patrol maneuvers and the Bogie got a bit bolder by dropping a bright float light on our port beam about 6-miles away; then, dropped a second float light about 2-miles away. The Bogie dropped two bombs between the SPENCE and the FOOTE - one was bearing 285-degrees and one 250-degrees. The idea is to keep the Bogie occupied so he will not bother the troop ships. He dropped four more flares at 0412 - closest, about one mile - too close. We opened fire with the 5-inch at range of 1,800-yards - the Bogie reversed course and headed away a best speed. We expended 30 rounds of 5-inch AA Common under radar control. As dawn began to break we could see Task Force 31 with the landing forces bombarding Treasury Island - the time was 0555.

By 0903 the beach was secured, ships were unloading and the beach area resistance was eliminated. All 6,000 New Zealanders were ashore taking care of business. At 1005 Task Group 39.3 begin retiring southeast toward Purvis Bay, Florida Island. We used various courses and speeds to conform to the channel as we entered Purvis Bay harbor at 1817. We tied up starboard side to SPENCE, in nest with CLAXTON, AUSBURNE and YO-169 in Berth #13. At 1850 we began taking on fuel. There had been no challenge by the Jap Surface forces - so, in reality, the operation had been a "cakewalk" for us - only casualty was no sleep for thirty seven hours.

As a diversion for the ongoing Treasuries operation and for the forthcoming Torokina invasion, 725 U.S. Marines landed on Choiseul Island, where they were to create confusion for about a week before withdrawing.

On 30 October we moved to Berth #20 and anchored in 22-fathoms of water putting out 90-fathoms of chain on the starboard anchor. We received, by barge, 50-rounds of 5-inch ammunition and 50-canisters of flashless powder. At 1354 a barge came alongside and topped-off our fuel tanks.

Late afternoon of the 30th all unit Commanders and ship’s Captains of Task Force 39 met in conference in USS MONTPELIER to receive a briefing on plans and details of the Buka Island and Shortland Island bombardments. The Task Force is to get underway at 0230 on 31 October. Due to the congestion in the harbor it was decided that some of the destroyers would get underway a bit early - the FOOTE weighed anchor at 0138 - SPENCE at 0145. CTF-39 Operations Plan 3-43 was underway. We passed through the anti-submarine net at 0221 - put out running lights and speed lights.

Task Force 39, as a whole, including eight "Little Beavers" destroyers and Admiral Tip Merrill’s four light cruisers shaped course for Bougianville. STANLY assumed station as picket 15,000-yards ahead of the force. Speed of advance is 15-knots.

As the Task Force moved north through the Solomon Sea - all ships were at General Quarters. We picked up two groups of Bogies at 2023, distance 16-miles - they appeared to parallel our course and gave no indication at anytime they had seen us. We lost power in the after engine room due to contaminated fuel and fell out of position by 12,000-yards. The problem was cleared and we were back on station at 2331.

The plan called for us to be in firing position to bombard Buka airfield at mid-night 31 October. At 2345 we passed Bonis Island abeam to starboard - distance 7-miles. The night was clear and dark with about 50% clouds, especially over the islands. The moon is three days past new and will set at 2126. There is a slight sea with swells from the southeast - wind force is two from the south.

Bogies were on the radar screen in considerable number at various bearings and altitudes - most appear to be operating from Buka. The Task Force was in bombardment formation and increased speed to 32-knots to arrive at scheduled firing position on time. The FOOTE and STANLY were to keep a careful check of the area to the north and west to detect, and if possible prevent, any interference with the bombardment.

As planned the flagship (MONTPLIER) was on the firing leg at 0002, 1 November. At 0020 all the cruisers began firing at the Buka airfield and shortly thereafter the glow of fires and explosions could be seen beyond the hills that intervened.


The Japs began to fire straight up apparently thinking they were being bombed from the air. It sure was a great pyrotechnic show - like July 4th fire-works display. Then, a shore battery commenced firing at the bombarding ships at 0028, but appeared to be at least 1,000-yards short. CONVERSE begin firing at 0032 and we followed in their wake. Two flares were dropped to the southwest, illuminating the rear of the bombardment column. The FOOTE visually picked up one two-engine single tail bomber and immediately took it under fire. The Bogie turned left and went out to the west apparently not damaged. At 0100 the Task Force came to retirement course and increased speed, in steps, to 34-knots. CONVERSE commenced firing at a Bogie that dropped four flares at 0122 and the FOOTE begin firing at the same plane at 0123. Again the plane was driven off to the west with no apparent damage.

At 0205 the Task Force course to the Shortland Islands was set and the 125-mile run to the southern end of Bougainville was underway. The trip was comparatively quiet except for distant Bogies and contact with our transports to the east of us.

The Japs were ready to greet TF-39 - they had the word we were coming. At 0527 we sounded General Quarters and changed course to get on the desired firing line. Shore batteries on the south side of Margusaia Island opened fire on the ships ahead and all ships concentrated on the shore batteries until 0628 when the Commander of the Task Force ordered the scheduled bombardment to be put into effect. FOOTE had a shore battery under fire and continued to fire on it until 0631. The FOOTE had been assigned the Korovo District for bombardment. Other ships were firing in this area and the huge clouds of dust, debris and smoke made it impossible to see where the salvos were landing. At 0640 we checked fire and spotted off the target area to find our own salvos and then resumed fire in the area. A shore battery on the north end of Alu Island bracketed the FOOTE about 150-yards on each beam. A straddle - that will get your attention. The range was extreme limit for our 5-inch guns, but we fired two salvos (10-rounds) in return and changed course and speed to take anti-submarine screening station as the Task Force began to retire. We must have gotten a lucky hit - the shore battery ceased firing - last shot by the shore battery was on in deflection, but 400-yards astern. At 0706 we were on retirement course making 25-knots and at 0717 began maneuvering to form Cruising Disposition Two. The Task Force began zig-zagging in accordance with Plan No. 6 at 0761 and all ships secured from General Quarters.

The FOOTE had expended 576 rounds of 5-inch projectiles with base fuzes and smokeless powder cartridges. In this phase of the operation we had no casualties to personnel or material.
The aircraft carriers SARATOGA and PRINCETON prepared to send their bombers in to complete the paralysis of the Buka and Bonia airfields if necessary. While local Japanese air support was neutralized and Japanese attention drawn first to one area and then another, Admiral Wilkinson’s Third Amphibious Force entered Empress Augusta Bay at dawn on 1 November and began landing U.S. Marines at Cape Torokina. Approximately 300 Japs put up a determined resistance at the beachhead that was quickly overcome. AIRSOL (Air Solomon) scattered a Jap air attack from Rabaul and by dark Wilkinson’s amphibians had landed 14,000 Marines and 6,000-tons of supplies.

After bombarding the Shortland Islands, Task Force 39 retired to the vicinity of Vella Lavella to get a little rest and await developments - everyone rested but DesRon-45. This division of four destroyers was dangerously low on fuel, so Burke led them, at high speed, to Kula Gulf for a fill-up from an oiler and then back up toward Bougainville - catching up with Task Force 39 at 2315 on 1 November. By this time Admiral Merrill’s Cruisers and DesDiv-46 were already heading for Empress Augusta Bay to intercept an approaching Japanese Cruiser/Destroyer force that was reported by reconnaissance planes. It was less than three hours until the fateful encounter for the FOOTE. (Continued)

(USS FOOTE War Diary, USS DENVER War Diary & Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, by E. B. Potter, U.S. Destroyer Operations in WW-II & the USS SPENCE Narrative of Action)

CREDIT STATEMENT
The drawings and cartoons used in this blog, signed "Gene", were drawn by shipmate Gene Schnaubelt, Fire Controlman 2/c (Now Deceased) at sea over 60-years ago. Not only a shipmate, but a dear friend who is badly missed. .

Thursday, January 05, 2006

Fletcher Class Destroyers


Fletcher Class Destroyer circa World War II
The Fletcher Class Destroyer was a "man of war" in every sense of the word. From her knife-like bow to her trim stern her lines tell you that she was built for speed. She bristled with guns, torpedoes and depth charges. It is apparent at a glance that this was a ship built for one purpose - ATTACK. It is very apparent that armament rather than armor is accented. The defenses were her speed and maneuverability.


In WW-II the Fletcher Class Destroyer did many things and did them well. She was built to be the most versatile ship in the Navy. Because of her tremendous capabilities the destroyer was necessary in every type of Naval Operation.


First of all, the destroyer is the primary opponent of the submarine. Only a destroyer or destroyer escort has the detection equipment to seek out and actively and accurately pinpoint an enemy submarine. During WW-II only a destroyer and destroyer escort had the weapons in sufficient quantity to attack and sink a submarine.


Secondly, the destroyer was a prime opponent of attacking enemy aircraft. With accurate, long range radar and excellent plotting capabilities, the destroyer can detect approaching hostile aircraft and vector friendly planes to intercept them. And, if they get close - the Fletcher Class Destroyer has three types of guns to actively combat the enemy planes.

Third, the Fletcher Class Destroyer was a prime opponent of enemy surface ships, using their torpedoes and radar controlled 5-inch guns, the destroyer can battle it out against much bigger and heavier ships.

Fourth, the destroyer carries her destructive power to the enemy on shore. Steaming close to the shoreline, destroyers use their 5-inch guns to bombard enemy beaches before our assault forces make an amphibious landing. Their gunfire support pinpoints enemy positions allowing our forces ashore to advance. They stand by for targets of opportunity designated by our personnel ashore.

All fast striking Naval forces were ringed with destroyers for protection. Destroyers operate far ahead of the attack force as pickets to give early warning of approaching enemy aircraft. They also screen the convoys of merchant ships to protect them from submarines, aircraft and surface attack.

Name a Naval operation and you will find that destroyers were there in numbers and in the forefront.

There is an absolute necessity for teamwork in destroyers - it is the way of destroyer life, it sets destroyer men apart from other Navy men. Their existance is a separate way of life - a life of informal rigid discipline necessitated by living in close quarters - a life of depending on each other - a life of constant effort toward perfection - a life of daily coping with the sea in all her moods.

Destroyer men do not have an easy life. But, they would not have it any other way. They have to be rugged to withstand the rigors of the sea and the way it can affect a small ship. They have to be smart - to work the thousand and one pieces of complicated machinery, electronic and gunnery equipment. They have to be well disciplined - for each man must learn to act automatically for if he fails in combat, lives may be lost.

During the long hard years of the Pacific war the Fletcher Class Destroyers became legends written in blood, sweat, glory and sacrifice. Steaming on their own, escorting convoys or serving with the main fleet, they wrote history that defies comprehensive description. Their guns and torpedoes lashed out at capital Japanese ships with telling effect in the many seesaw battles around the Solomons. As the great island taking campaign began, their firepower belched salvo after salvo in fire support missions, often battling enemy shore batteries at point blank range. Frequently, the Fletchers fought hard and long, withdrawing from the firing line only when their ammunition was virtually exhausted.

But, it would be off the bloody shores of Okinawa in the spring of 1945 that the Fletcher Class Destroyer fought their greatest combined battle of the war. Taking Okinawa was considered essential prior to the invasion of Japan proper. This would be a last-ditch campaign for the Japanese. Okinawa was so close to the Japanese homeland that they launched the full fury of their Kamikaze effort against the Navy. Attacking in droves and intent on dying for the Emperor the Kamikaze of the "Devine Wind" sought to break the back of the powerful invasion fleet. For a time it seemed that they may succeed. Day after day and night after night, despite intensive withering anti-aircraft fire that downed over 7,800 Japanese planes, they continues to plunge from the sky in explosive laden aircraft intent only on destroying themselves and their hapless floating targets. More than a thousand ships, large and small, were damaged in this fierce battle that rages on for 82 long days and nights.

No ships felt the vicious sting of this onslaught more than the destroyers on Radar Picket Stations as early warning sentinels. The Navy would lose over 5,000 men, not counting the wounded. A total of 36 ships were lost in this ferocious assault - among them 23 destroyers sunk or so badly damaged they had to be scrapped.

It was this devastating blood bath of lost sailors and the 12,500 soldiers and marines killed on Okinawa that led to the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Heroshima. The U.S. Navy, and especially the destroyer sailors, would long remember the hell of the war’s last bitter battle.

Each destroyer was a floating microcosm of the nation and culture far away. Yet, even in their stifling cramped quarters, crewmen somehow shared the strains of wartime life at sea in a way that would forever bond them as shipmates. They were men at war in a ship of war and each firmly believed their ship was the finest "bucket" in the fleet. When the last call to General Quarters sounded, the men who manned the Fletcher Class Destroyers could well boast of having fought the long road to victory from the Solomons to Tokyo Bay - establishing a record of valor and accomplishment that will never be repeated. As a single class, the Fletchers earned the most battle stars in WW-II - 873 in all.

Now the 175 Fletcher Class Destroyers are history. Fortunately, three have been preserved as museum ships for today’s generations. USS KIDD DD-661, the best restored ship in the historic fleet, can be seen at Baton Rouge, LA, USS CASSIN YOUNG DD-793 at Charlestown Navy Yard, Boston, MA and the USS SULLIVANS DD-537 at Buffalo, NY. They survive as proud reminders of a class of warship that was the backbone of America’s Destroyer Fleet for almost 30-years. The Fletcher Class Destroyers and the proud sailors who manned them deserve to be remembered into eternity.